The EU and the Mercosur Deal: Lessons for Brexit by Behrens, Paul
The EU and the Mercosur Deal: 
Lessons for Brexit 
By Dr Paul Behrens is Reader in Law at the University of 
Edinburgh 
These days, it is difficult to open a newspaper without being hit by 
more dramatic news about the British car industry. Honda 
has announced the closure of its Swindon plant. Nissan will no 
longer produce the X trail in Sunderland. Ford has decided to close 
the Bridgend factory. BMW warns that, in the case of a no-deal Brexit, 
it may no longer make the Mini at its plant near Oxford. In the first half 
of 2019, investment in the car sector fell by more than 70%. 
In the middle of all that comes news of a deal which the European 
Union has just concluded with Mercosur, the South American trade 
bloc. Cars are made in continental Europe, too, but in Mercosur 
states, trade in these goods has hit a snag: the tariffs on cars in these 
countries stand at an eye-watering 35%. Under the new agreement, 
these tariffs will be removed. The advantages are obvious, and they 
do not just apply to the folks in the boardroom: even now, more than 
800,000 jobs in the EU are linked to exports with Mercosur countries, 
and Mercosur companies employ more than 60,000 people in the EU. 
These are exciting days for the EU – and the decision of a country 
with a significant car industry to leave the trading bloc at this very 
moment is, shall we say, a bold one. 
But there are other reasons why the Mercosur deal offers interesting 
insights for Brexit Britain. 
The organisation itself is a fascinating creature. Mercosur – the 
‘Mercado Común del Sur’ or Common Market of the South – has only 
four members, but they include big economies: Brazil and Argentina 
are part of it, as are Paraguay and Uruguay. Bolivia intends to join, six 
other States are associate members. When it was founded in 1991, it 
took as its model the European Community. Eurosceptic politicians 
might find it interesting to learn that none of the founding States were 
worried about submitting to a new form of slavery – quite the contrary. 
Héctor Gros Espiell, then Foreign Minister of Uruguay, stated that 
Mercosur implied ‘a kind of second independence’ for his State. 
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And this has nothing to do with Mercosur perhaps having ‘better 
control’ over its borders (the battle cry of the Leave camp in the Brexit 
referendum). Like the EU, Mercosur has established freedom of 
movement (although the details differ: under the Mercosur Residence 
Agreement,  Mercosur citizens have a right to temporary residence in 
other member States for two years, but this can then be transformed 
into permanent residence). In fact, an increasing number of countries 
realise that freedom of movement often makes economic sense. In 
the UK itself, the Foreign Affairs committee called on the government 
to make it easier for Indian nationals to come to Britain, in order to 
facilitate a trade deal with India. 
The new EU-South American market that is to be born, is impressive. 
Mercosur is the fifth largest economy outside the EU; its population 
stands at over 260 million people. Altogether, the deal will cover more 
than 700 million people – creating one of the largest markets in the 
world. The elimination of tariffs concerns not only cars: tariffs will 
be reduced on 92% of Mercosur’s exports and on 91% of those by EU 
companies. Both sides have high expectations: the South American 
countries are hoping to sell beef and other farm products. The EU is 
looking forward to savings on pharmaceutical products (which 
currently have tariffs of up to 14%), car parts (14 – 18% ) and textiles 
(up to 35%). 
The deal, it is true, does not come without criticism. Environmental 
organisations in particular are uneasy: an increase in beef exports can 
lead to more agricultural activity and wider destruction of the 
Amazon rainforest. These are legitimate concerns, and they must not 
be taken lightly. On the other hand, the agreement commits both the 
EU and Mercosur to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change and to tackling deforestation. One thing at least is 
clear: we do not live in a world in which environmental concerns can 
be handled by one State alone, in which climate change can be 
prevented by unilateral efforts. If two major trading blocs agree on 
common values in that regard, they can make an effective contribution 
to the benefit of the whole of mankind. 
Trade deals had been a crucial feature of the Brexit debate even 
before the 2016 referendum took place. That is not surprising: the 
Cameron government noted that 44% of British exports went to the 
EU, with EU trade agreements covering a further 12%. If deals under 
negotiation are included, that figure increases to 82% of total exports. 
And that assessment is three years old. Since then, things have 
developed with astonishing speed. CETA, the EU-Canadian trade 
agreement, entered provisionally into force in 2017; In 2018, the EU 
commission presented its trade agreement with Vietnam, and in 
February 2019, the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU 
and Japan entered into force. 
And these treaties matter to the UK: analysis by the Financial Times 
(in 2017) found that there were more than 750 EU treaties which had 
relevance to Britain and which, after Brexit, would be ‘lost’ – 295 of 
which were trade agreements. 
Still – some take a decidedly relaxed view of the whole matter. When 
Liam Fox was Trade Minister, he was the picture of optimism: rolling 
over EU free trade agreements after Brexit, was, according to him, no 
problem, and Brexit offered an opportunity to ‘reinvigorate our 
Commonwealth partnerships’. As a matter of fact, however, with less 
than three months to go until the envisaged Brexit date, only 12 
‘continuity deals’ have been agreed. 
Here, too, the Mercosur deal offers lessons: it took the EU a 
staggering 20 years to conclude the deal, and it still needs to be 
ratified to enter into force. CETA took a long time too – negotiations 
officially started in 2009. 
There are reasons for that. Companies are not the only ones who 
insist on having their concerns reflected: trade unions want to be 
heard, as do environmental organisations, and animal rights groups. 
Then there is the tricky question of dispute settlement: who has the 
final say if disagreements about the treaty arise? And who has the 
right to start legal action? And there is the curse of changing 
governments: the one with which you started your negotiations, may 
be all in favour of a trade deal. But as time goes on, it may be 
replaced by protectionists who are afraid of consequences for their 
own industries. 
Most of all, however, there are often red lines on both sides. They 
exist for good reasons. For the EU, for instance, an important aspect 
in the Mercosur deal was that its own food safety rules would not 
change and that imported food would have to comply with EU 
standards. Both parties aim to increase animal welfare standards; 
both parties agree to support the existing rights of workers. 
Red lines can be stumbling blocks, abandoning them can be an 
overwhelming temptation. For a post Brexit government, keen on 
making progress, it must be more than a little seductive to tweak 
those cumbersome standards – a little change here, an innocent 
amendment there, to please the bigger players in the field. It would 
certainly smooth negotiations and speed up the process. 
Yet in the brave new Britain that might stand at the end of that journey 
– a country in which US private healthcare companies have 
enhanced access to the NHS, in which workers’ rights have 
been scuttled, and in which chlorinated chicken graces the dinner 
table, it will be entirely legitimate to ask whether the Britain of old – 
before Brexit, and under the protection of European standards – had 
not been the better alternative. 
 
